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I. Introduction 
 
Decentralization of borrowing authority to sub-national government and fiscal sustainability at the national 
level are two issues in permanent tension in public financial management. On one side of the argument, it 
is desirable to give sub-national authorities room for raising their own financial resources in order to finance 
capital investment for the provision of goods and services to their communities. On the other side of the 
argument, the lack of institutional capacity, history of sub-national government defaults in other 
decentralized systems, and the potential lack of effective controls at the least give central governments 
substantial arguments to restrict sub-national government autonomy. Thus, the challenge is whether is 
possible to simultaneously achieve the goals of providing borrowing autonomy and maintain fiscal discipline 
preventing the insolvency of sub-national governments.  
 
Furthermore, sub-national governments have less incentive than the central governments to be concerned 
with macroeconomic impact of their policies because they do no bear the full cost of their actions (“moral 
hazard”). Therefore, to sub-national governments, macroeconomic stability has public goods 
characteristics. Some authors contend that fiscal decentralization can enhance macroeconomic stability 
(Fukasaku and De Mello, 1998) while others assert there are significant costs associated with insuring 
macroeconomic stability through decentralization and that achieving this goal requires thoroughly 
disciplined sub-national borrowing (Ter-Minassian, 1997). The empirical literature on this issue is 
inconclusive. It is therefore important to investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic 
stability in the presence of borrowing regulation.  
 
Fiscal decentralization is increasingly seen as a tool to promote economic efficiency. Oates (1993) 
explains, “the provision of local outputs that are differentiated according to local tastes and circumstances 
results in higher levels of social welfare than centrally determined and more uniform levels of outputs 
across all jurisdictions.” (p. 240). Two basic mechanisms are involved here. The first mechanism relates to 
Hayek’s (1945) knowledge problem, which states that wide dispersion of knowledge causes central 
planning to fail.1 Decentralized authorities, on the other hand, are in much better position to be responsive 
to variations in local demand. The second mechanism is related to the idea government as a monopolist. 
As Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest, “the potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the 
number of competing governmental units in the inclusive territory.” (p. 180). Therefore, greater competition 
between governments can limit their ability to extract monopoly rents, enhancing economic efficiency and 
economic growth.  
 
                                                            
1 “The economic problem of society is . . . a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its totality. . . . [This] is 
at least one of the main problems of economic policy - or of designing an efficient economic system. . . . This is not a dispute 
about whether planning is to be done or not. It is a dispute as to whether planning if to be done centrally, by one authority for the 
whole economic system, or to be divided among many individuals” (pp. 519–521). 
“If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular 
circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar 
with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. 
We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after 
integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization. . . . We need decentralization 
because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used” (p. 
524). 
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Due to widespread decentralization of spending responsibilities, increasing revenue power and borrowing 
capacity of sub-national governments, sub-national borrowing has become an increasingly important 
source of sub-national finance. Proponents of sub-national borrowing emphasize four benefits: (i) 
expansion of sub-national fiscal space for infrastructure financing; (ii) efficient and inter-generational 
equitable outcomes from infrastructure financing through borrowing; (iii) increased fiscal transparency of 
sub-national governments; and (iv) deepening of financial markets. However, while there is considerable 
consensus on those potential benefits, there is also wide agreement that without an effective regulatory 
framework sub-national borrowing may lead to fiscal and debt crises and significantly contribute to an 
unstable macroeconomic environment.  
 
For certain, appropriate regulatory frameworks where borrowing or deficit financing is only allowed to 
finance capital investments (the so called “golden rule”) accompanied by limits on the level of debt and debt 
servicing capacity can reduce the chances of default and debt crises. However, other institutional factors 
must be present. In particular, sub sub-national governments must have access to significant tax bases, 
because otherwise, even if borrowing is put into productive use, it may still cause fiscal crises. Dependence 
on inter governmental transfers might lead to unsustainable borrowing since high levels of transfer 
dependence often undermine the credibility of the central government's commitment not to bail out troubled 
sub-national governments. By a similar logic, when sub-national governments are funded primarily by the 
taxes they raise and collect themselves, the central government can commit more easily to a no bail out 
policy, thus giving creditors and voters stronger signals and incentives to “punish” sub-national officials for 
excessive spending and borrowing.  
 
Despite the importance of these issues, little systematic empirical work has been done so far on the role of 
sub-national borrowing and borrowing control on fiscal sustainability. Therefore, the question this study tries 
to answer is whether controlled sub-national performs better or worse comparing to prohibition of borrowing 
in maintaining fiscal sustainability, and if yes, which setting performs superiorly and under which 
circumstances. 
 
These issues are of particular importance because rapidly rising sub-national debt has played a crucial role 
in recent financial crisis in several countries and those experiences hold important lessons for other 
countries undergoing fiscal decentralization. The few studies that evaluate the effect of sub-national 
borrowing on fiscal performance either use only debt level or some aggregate measure of borrowing 
autonomy that does not take into account different types of regulations, monitoring and enforcement. From 
our perspective, qualitative indicators of fiscal decentralization, such as taxing powers or autonomy  of sub-
national governments to decide on tax base and tax rates, different forms of borrowing powers and 
regulation and enforcement, must be considered to avoid obtaining biased and misleading empirical results 
on the effect of sub-national borrowing on fiscal performance.  
 
This study employs a panel data set of 602 countries, between 1990 and 2008.  Variables of primary 
interest are qualitative indicators on sub-national borrowing control regimes which countries in the sample 
employ during the observed period. The information on these qualitative indicators is collected by the 
author from various sources3. Because sub-national borrowing control regimes are not mutually excludable, 
and countries usually implement more than one set of controls, the qualitative indicator for each country in 
the sample represents the regime which is dominantly applied. Fiscal sustainability is defined based on 
                                                            
2 See Appendix for the list of countries.  
3 For the list of sources by country, see Table A4 in the Appendix. 
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annual change in general government budget balance and budget is considered as sustainable if the 
annual change is equal or greater that some predetermined threshold. This study uses zero percent 
change as baseline threshold and, for the purpose of robustness analysis, applies alternative thresholds of 
0.5, 0.75 and 1 percent. The applied methodology is survival analysis which is appropriate for evaluating 
the effect of each borrowing control regimes on duration of fiscal sustainability.  
 
Obtained results suggest fiscal rules to perform dominantly in sustaining fiscal consolidation. Second, 
results suggest that market discipline performs the least favorably comparing to other three approaches 
and prohibited sub-national borrowing, which corresponds to the fact that in many countries the 
requirements for market discipline as a successful instrument for sub-national borrowing control are not 
met. Finally, administrative and cooperative regimes in presence of high fiscal dependence on central 
government financing seem to increase the probability of ending a consolidation episode. This result is not 
surprising given that these two regimes refer to significantly high degree of central government control, 
which may increase the risk of moral hazard. Strong central government control may give encouraging 
signs to the sub-national governments to over borrow and to expect being bailed out by the central 
government. This deteriorates the general government budget directly, through unplanned bailout from the 
central government, and indirectly, through spillover effect on other sub-national governments who are as 
well highly fiscally dependent on central government financing. Finally, the robustness analysis suggests 
that the rule based and administrative controls over sub-national borrowing consistently perform dominantly 
comparing to other regimes.  
 
The results obtained in this study imply following important policy recommendations. First, sub-national 
government borrowing does not have to endanger overall fiscal sustainability if the borrowing control 
framework is well designed. Second, reducing fiscal dependence on central government financing and, in 
return, giving more tax autonomy to sub-national government, reduces the risk of moral hazard and 
improves the effectiveness of borrowing control in maintaining fiscal balance at the sustainable level.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides brief literature review on the effect of 
fiscal decentralization and sub-national borrowing on macroeconomic stability. Section III describes 
institutional background of four broad approaches that have been used to regulate or control the operation 
of sub-national credit markets. Section IV provides details on applied methodology. Section V explains 
results obtained using baseline threshold and from robustness analysis. Finally, section VI concludes the 
study.  
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The first theoretical examination of fiscal decentralization was undertaken by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave 
(1959), and Oates (1972). Fiscal decentralization is widely advocated with an argument that it improves 
economic performance by increasing economic efficiency in the provision of public sector services. Some, 
however, argue that fiscal decentralization can impact economic performance when sub-national 
governments have uncontrolled expenditures, which adversely affects national fiscal policy and 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
There is a large and wide-ranging literature investigating economic benefits of fiscal decentralization that 
are claimed by its advocates. Majority of these studies focuses on the effect of either revenue or 
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expenditure decentralization on economic performance, with just few exemptions considering the 
relationship between borrowing autonomy and fiscal sustainability (De Mello, 2001; Martinez-Vazquez and 
Boex, 2001; Rodden, 2002; Wibbels and Rodden, 2007; Martell, 2008). 
 
Decentralization and Macroeconomic Stability 
Large part of recent literature focuses on the macroeconomic problems that arise with devolving greater 
responsibilities to the sub-national governments. Empirical results obtained by Prud'homme (1994), Hunter 
and Shah (1996) and Ter-Minassian (1997) suggest that decentralization results in sub-national fiscal 
indiscipline and aggravated fiscal problems at the central level. De Mello (2000) finds that in developing 
countries expenditure devolution tends to worsen central government balance. Fornasari and Steven 
(2000) also find that increases in sub-national spending leads to increases in national spending and 
deficits. However, Stein (1999) shows that decentralization is not associated with higher deficits in Latin 
America. Similarly, Shome (2002) finds that decentralization is associated with lower fiscal deficits both at 
the state and central government levels in India. 4 
 
However, some authors emphasize that decentralization can also cause macroeconomic problems when 
key institutional and financial pillars are absent from the federal framework. Coordination difficulties 
between the various layers of government can challenge macroeconomic sustainability even in the least 
decentralized of systems. Various studies (Tanzi, 2000; Dabla-Norris and Wade, 2002) find that incentives 
for responsible fiscal behavior and hard-budget constraints are undermined when the federal framework is 
characterized by a (i) lack of local autonomy over expenditure and revenue decisions, and a high degree of 
dependence on transfers; (ii) lack of constraints on sub-national indebtedness; (iii) lack of clarity in the 
respective roles of each tier of government; and (iv) weak budget institutions. In his study, Rodden (2002) 
shows that decentralization is associated with large and persistent general government deficits when sub-
national governments are simultaneously dependent on transfers and are free to borrow. 
 
How to regulate sub-national borrowing?  
There are different ways in which the national government can contribute to prudent borrowing. Which 
option to take is a much-debated issue (Peterson, 2000). Literature on sub-national borrowing emphasizes 
the ability of higher levels of government to provide an implicit guarantee on sub-national government debt 
as one of main problems with borrowing at the sub-national level. This is a classical moral hazard situation, 
whereby borrowers are likely to over borrow and creditors are likely to over lend in response to this 
unwritten official insurance. The question is whether such a risk can be successfully controlled by some 
kind of rule, or if the credit market can do the job on its own. A fundamental decision that a national 
government has to take is whether to provide a sovereign guarantee or not. With a sovereign guarantee, 
the national government takes final responsibility in dealing with a financial crisis of sub-national entities. If 
a sub-national entity is unable to re-pay debt, the national government would step in and bail out the failed 
creditor. Each country needs to decide how to deal with the above-mentioned challenges when establishing 
a legal framework. National governments have adopted different responses to the challenges of 
decentralized decision-making. A key question is how a country chooses to control sub-national borrowing 
in order to avoid the risks associated with it. 
 
Based on a sample that includes Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, and South Africa, Martell and 
Guess (2006) consider the legal framework to be of paramount importance and suggest establishing such a 
                                                            
4 Except when transfers are excluded. The inability of states to fund their own-expenditure without central government transfers 
results in higher state-level deficits. 
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framework first in a sequence of reforms, followed by a viable supply-side and a creditworthy demand-side 
of the borrowing market. A regulatory framework should at least deal with three challenges:  
 
- First, a regulatory framework must not prohibit sub-national borrowing. Rather, the legal framework 
should be such that sub-national entities are allowed to engage on their own with financial markets 
to finance their projects. In that sense, the regulatory framework enables demand by devolution of 
borrowing power to sub-national entities. It is furthermore important to stipulate which levels of 
government may borrow. This helps regulating the interaction of different levels of government. 
 
- Second, a regulatory framework should provide predictability, clarity and confidence in sub-national 
borrowing. Only a clearly stated legal framework can encourage participants, ranging from 
investors to municipal officers to engage with sub-national borrowing. To play this overarching role, 
the design of the framework is crucial: The framework needs to be well formulated, comprehensible 
and consistent. It also has to cover all necessary aspects. 
 
- Third, a good regulatory framework can reduce the risk of imprudent borrowing by preventing over-
borrowing and by providing instructions on how to deal with financial crises. Over-borrowing at the 
sub-national level and instability at the macroeconomic level in form of financial deficits or inflation 
are less likely to happen when there is a good system of regulations. 
 
Empirical support for the hypothesis that institutional constraints limit government spending is not fully 
conclusive. While rare cross country evidence shows that the effectiveness of institutional constraints 
heavily depends on the type of control being imposed and a number of idiosyncrasies of the country in 
question (Plekhanov and Singh, 2006), there is mixed evidence from country-level studies conducted in the 
United States and Europe. For other sources of debt finance in the United States, Abrams and Dougan 
(1986) conclude that restrictions on borrowing and spending are not significant in explaining state budget 
outcomes. The French case appears to suggest that macroeconomic policy measures emanating from the 
central government do affect local government borrowing decisions (Derycke and Gilbert, 1985). Less 
conclusive results are obtained by Kenyon (1991) on the effects of caps on federal and local tax-exempt 
bond issues in the United States. While caps were shown to be effective in reducing the volume of 
borrowing, they do not appear to have a significant impact on whether sub-national governments substitute 
tax-exempt bonds for other sources of borrowing.  
 
Further confirmation that institutional restrictions do matter can be found in Alt and Lowry (1994), who 
examine the effectiveness of state-level fiscal control in the United States. Their empirical results suggest 
that divided party governance matters when it comes to responding to exogenous shocks. Interestingly, 
they also find significant differences between Democrats and Republicans when it comes to fiscally 
relevant decisions. Although more cautious in arriving at general conclusions, Poterba (1995) provides 
further confirmation of the role of fiscal rules in the United States. The opposite result can be found in a 
study of Spain by Cabases et al. (2007). This provides evidence that municipalities are sensitive to 
institutional restrictions on their decisions to borrow. On the one hand, borrowing appears to be used 
mainly for investment as established by the law. On the other hand, restrictions on short-term and 
emergency borrowing based upon a maximum percentage of the previous year’s revenues significantly 
affect levels of current-year indebtedness. The type of municipality and the level of local co-funding also 
matter as far as municipal borrowing is concerned. 
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III. Institutional Background: Sub-national borrowing control regimes 
 
In order to have a better understanding of the impact of sub-national borrowing, it is desirable to review the 
different institutional settings that have been used to regulate or control the operation of sub-national credit 
markets. In this section we review four main, not mutually excludable, settings that can be found in the 
international practice, namely: (i) market discipline; (ii) rule-based controls; (iii) administrative controls; and 
(iv) cooperative approach (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997).  
 
III.1 Market Discipline 
Some countries rely exclusively on capital markets to restrain sub-national borrowing. Market discipline 
means that financial markets are capable to send appropriate signals to prevent a borrower from entering 
the “unsustainable area.” There are, however, certain preconditions that need to be satisfied for financial 
private markets to be an effective control instrument for sub-national borrowing. These include (Lane, 
1993): (i) capital markets must be free and open; (ii) potential lenders must have available information 
about the borrower’s outstanding debt and repayment capacity; (iii) there should be no chance or possibility 
of bailout of lenders by the central government; and (iv) borrowers must have the ability to respond with 
adequate policies to the signals sent by the market.  
 
In this sort of setting, sub-national governments have generally direct access to financial markets to meet 
their borrowing requirements. Also they independently decide how much and from whom to borrow, and on 
what to spend the borrowed money. Relying on market discipline in controlling the sub-national borrowing 
has worked in countries with high standards of transparency and governance at all government levels, and 
with no significant history of bailouts. In most emerging markets and developing countries, however, as well 
as in some developed countries, one or more the requirements for effective market discipline on sub-
national borrowing are missing. In particular, information on sub-national finance is often not accurate and 
comprehensive enough, sub-national governments often have access to borrowing funds under “privileged” 
terms (e.g. municipal development banks or sub-national enterprises), and many have significant bailout 
histories (through fiscal gap filling transfers or through debt restructuring). Moreover, existence of implicit 
guarantee by the central government prevents market signals to work effectively.  
 
Examples of market disciple in controlling the sub-national borrowing can be found, among some others, in 
provinces in Canada, the U.S. states and Swedish municipalities. However, as mentioned above, in many 
parts of the world, the capital markets at the local level are inadequately developed to be able to efficiently 
discipline sub-national governments. In such circumstances, credit rating agencies at the sub-national level 
are becoming increasingly important to evaluate the performance of intergovernmental system. In this 
same context, some sub-national governments have adopted fiscal responsibility rules (that are self-
imposed) trying to improve their credit rating in the market. Examples for these trends are present in 
Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. Some countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Peru, recently have sought to follow this approach, at least partially, with the introduction of a 
Fiscal Responsibility Laws (Webb, 2004). 
 
III.2 Rule Based Approach 
Rule-based controls consist of fiscal rules imposed by the central government and specified in the 
constitution or in organic laws. Such rules introduce a constraint on fiscal choices by sub-national 
governments to guarantee that fiscal outcomes will remain predictable and robust regardless of the 
government in charge. Rules may take different forms: ceilings on debt or total borrowing, deficit targets, 
7
 
 
maximum expenditure rules, the “golden rule” (borrowing proceeds must be spent exclusively on capital 
projects), or rules related to debt payment capacity. 
 
Debt ceilings are in general simple and easy to monitor. A deficit target has the advantage of simplicity as 
well, and of being easily understood by the wider public, but it may be unsuccessful in preventing excessive 
debt accumulation because of off-budget items. The most frequent deficit target rules are those targeting 
the overall budget deficit (for example, Austria, Belgium, Spain, and most U.S. states) or operating deficit 
(for example, Norway). However, deficit target rules can be met with higher revenues and expenditures as 
well, which may have macroeconomic implications. Expenditure rules set the limits on expenditure level, 
and are conceptually simple, easy to monitor, and can be most directly controlled. The golden rule, limiting 
sub-national governments’ borrowing to investment purposes only, mostly satisfies the intergenerational 
equity justification for borrowing. However, borrowing for infrastructure does not guarantee by itself 
macroeconomic and debt stability. Typically, infrastructure investments are required to provide “adequate” 
economic and social rates of return to be desirable or be approved. Many countries currently implement 
some form of the golden rule (for example, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and most states in the 
U.S.) Rules related to debt repayment capacity attempt to simulate the workings of the market discipline 
approach by relating the limits on the indebtedness to expected debt service on the debt. 
 
Fiscal rules have the advantage of being generally transparent, more effective in addressing long-term 
sustainability and intergenerational equity, depending on the accuracy of financial indicators, and relatively 
easy to monitor. Their effectiveness, however, depends on their specificity, comprehensiveness of 
coverage, and, most importantly, the degree of political commitment to their observance and enforcement. 
They as well can be counterproductive if poorly designed, that is, if in particular, there is no clear 
specification of appropriate escape clauses and of credible sanctions for noncompliance. It is needless to 
say that the availability of information to timely access compliance is crucial to the fiscal rules’ 
effectiveness. Most countries using a rule-based approach use a variety of rules, sometimes redundant.  
 
III.3 Administrative Approach 
This approach gives the central government direct control over sub-national borrowing. Administrative 
controls may take different forms that vary in comprehensiveness and degree of detail. Examples are 
setting an annual (or even more frequently) limits on the overall sub-national government debt; prohibition 
of external (foreign) borrowing; review and approval of individual borrowing operations (including approval 
of the terms and conditions); or the centralization of all government borrowing with on-lending to sub-
national governments. Administrative controls have tended to focus more on overall levels of borrowing and 
debt, rather than on authorization of individual borrowing operations.  
 
Countries like Greece, Ireland, Mexico, or the United Kingdom practice administrative controls.  In Mexico, 
the states and municipalities, including their decentralized agencies and public enterprises, can only borrow 
domestically to finance investment outlays up to the ceilings set by their respective legislatures. Unlike 
several other countries in Latin America, Mexico does not have a Fiscal Responsibility Law even under 
consideration. It uses financial sector regulations instead to motivate state-level prudence. In the United 
Kingdom, a local authority may not, without the consent of the Treasury, borrow from a lender from abroad 
or other than in sterling. In Spain, for example, foreign debt and bond issuances by sub-national 
governments are subject to the approval of the ministry of finance. 
 
Administrative controls, especially when central authorization of individual sub-national borrowing is 
involved, carry a significant moral hazard, resulting from the fact that central government may find it difficult 
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to refuse to financially support the lower levels of government in the case of impending defaults. On the 
other hand, the administrative approach has several advantages. First, the central government can control 
both the macroeconomic and external debt policy. Second, central government’s control may increase sub-
national borrower’s credibility, given that foreign lenders often require a central government guarantee, and 
it is likely result in better terms and conditions received in foreign financial markets. In overall, the 
effectiveness of administrative approach in controlling sub-national borrowing and promoting their fiscal 
discipline depends crucially on the de-politicization of the central government’s decisions, and on 
availability of information needed to shape these decisions and check their enforcement. 5 
 
III.4 Cooperative Approach 
Under this approach, sub-national borrowing controls are designed through a negotiation process between 
the federal/central and the lower levels of government. Sub-national governments are actively involved in 
reaching an agreement on overall general government deficit targets, on main revenue and expenditure 
items, as well as on the limits on financing of individual sub-national jurisdictions. This approach is in 
practice in some European countries and in Australia. 
 
In Austria, for example, the “Consultation mechanism” between different levels of government and the 
“Stability pact” were implemented in 1999 (Thoni, Garbislander, and Haas, 2002) to ensure lowering and 
maintaining the overall deficit below 3 percent. Similar arrangements exist in Spain (Lopez-Laborda et al. 
,200??). In Belgium, the sub national borrowing is supervised by a High Finance Council (HFC), which 
comprises members nominated by the federal, regional, and community levels, and the Belgian National 
Bank. In Australia, a fiscal institution called the Loan Council coordinates the fiscal policies and borrowing 
decisions of Australian states. Brazil and Argentina as well promote cooperation between levels of 
government. 6 
 
The cooperative approach combines many individual advantages of the other three approaches which is 
both its main strength and its main weakness. A clear advantage lies in promoting dialogue and exchange 
of information across various government levels, as well as in raising awareness of the macroeconomic 
implications of their budgetary choices. However, the preconditions for its success include the absence of 
severe fiscal stress; relative homogeneity of the sub-national units; a tradition of cooperation in 
intergovernmental relations; relatively strong bargaining position of the central government to be able to 
effectively guide the intergovernmental negotiations, which in many emerging markets’ conditions may not 
be the case; and availability of reliable and timely information to access compliance with agreed borrowing 
limits. Finally, weakness of the cooperative approach is that when it is poorly implemented it reproduces the 
flaws of other approaches, instead of their advantages (Ahmad, Albino, and Singh, 2005).  
 
 
IV. Methodology and Variables 
 
IV.1 Methodology 
Two alternative approaches can be undertaken to assess the determinants of fiscal sustainability using 
survival analysis, namely gradient approach and level approach (Adam and Bevan, 2003). Under the 
gradient approach, fiscal adjustment ends when a country fails to keep reducing the deficit by a certain 
                                                            
5 Including information on off-budget activities of the sub-national government, and on incurred arrears. 
6 Brazil through debt restructuring agreements with states and municipalities, and Argentina through bilateral pacts between the 
nation and the provinces.  
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threshold amount each year.  Under the level approach, the end of fiscal consolidation episode is reached 
when the deficit goes above a certain deficit threshold. In this study a modified gradient approach is chosen 
with 0 percent threshold. A fiscal adjustment is considered as continuing if budget balance as a share of 
total expenditure changes by more than 0 percentage points per year. 
 
This study employs annual panel data between 1990 and 2008 for 607 developed, developing and 
countries in transition. To define the dependent variable, this study uses general government8 primary9 
balance (Budget Balance), as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). The reason for choosing general 
government rather than primary budget balance at the sub-national level is the following: When the central 
government faces the sub-national fiscal imbalances, it can react in the following three ways. First option 
for the central government is to cover the sub-national imbalances. Second option is to design the tax 
and/or transfer system through which the sub-national government would receive larger portion of the 
overall revenues collected. Finally, the third option is that the central government ignores the sub-national 
fiscal imbalances. Regardless of which option the central government will choose, the overall national fiscal 
balance is likely to deteriorate.  
 
Based on these data, a dummy variable called “Failure” is generated, which takes value zero when the 
annual variation of Budget Balance is greater or equal zero (years of fiscal consolidation), and takes value 
one when the annual variation is lower than zero (years of fiscal expansion). Using the dates in which 
failure event occurs, a new variable called “Duration” is built, which counts the intervening years between 
consecutive failures (the time span that fiscal consolidation lasts). In our sample, the minimum number of 
years that a consolidation lasts is one year, and the maximum is fifteen years.  
 
Table1 presents the structure of data on Failure and Duration. The total number of observations is 847 and 
the average duration of fiscal consolidations is around 2 years, the maximum duration being 10 years. The 
number of registered failures is 330, and the average probability of ending a fiscal consolidation is 39 
percent. Figure1 shows the duration of fiscal consolidations in the period 1990-2008, where 44 percent of 
fiscal consolidations lasts one year, 25 percent two years, 13.7 percent lasts three years, and 17.3 percent 
lasts four and more years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 List of countries provided in the Appendix.  
8 The general government sector consists of entities that fulfill the functions of government as their primary activity and can be 
divided into central, state, and local government subsectors, depending on a country. In the Government Finance System (GFS), 
statistics for the general government sector and each of its subsectors are presented on a consolidated basis, to avoid the 
double counting of transactions. Consolidation involves the elimination of all transactions “that occur among the units being 
consolidated. In other words, a transaction of one unit is paired with the same transaction as recorded for the second unit and 
both transactions are eliminated … For example … consolidated  interest revenue and expense exclude the interest  paid by the 
debtor general government unit to the  creditor. Similarly, sales of goods and services between consolidated units are also 
eliminated.” (Internatinal Monetary Fund, 2001)(Internatinal Monetary Fund, 2001: 33) 
9 Revenues – Expenditures + Interest Payments 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Failure and Duration 
 Failure Duration 
Mean 0.390 2.267 
Standard Deviation 0.488 1.164 
Variance 0.238 2.770 
Skewness 0.453 1.819 
Kurtosis 1.205 6.742 
Number of failures 330 
Observations 847 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A. Non-parametric Estimation 
The time dependency of duration. This section proceeds very briefly with the non-parametric analysis, 
which tries to investigate whether fiscal consolidation is positively or negatively dependent on their 
accumulated duration. This is typically done by estimating the two following functions: 
 
1. The survivor function gives the probability that the duration of the fiscal consolidation (T)10 is 
greater or  equal to t, and is defined as 
  
 
2. The hazard function gives, for each duration, the probability of ending a consolidation episode, 
conditioned on the duration of the consolidation through that moment, and is defined as 
                                                            
10 T is the discrete random variable that measures the time that passes between the beginning of a fiscal 
consolidation and its transition to a non-consolidation period. 
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Figure 2 shows the estimated survivor function, where we can see that about 30 percent of episodes lasts 3 
years or more.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimated hazard function, in Figure 3, gives evidence of positive dependence of fiscal consolidations 
on their accumulated duration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Parametric Estimation 
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Non-parametric analysis does not allow one to analyze other factors other than accumulated duration that 
may explain the probability of ending fiscal consolidations. To address this issue, we estimate a Model of 
Proportional Hazard (PH), which assumes that the hazard function can be split as follows: 
 
 
 
where  is the baseline hazard that captures the dependency of data to duration, while  is a 
function of individual variables. This function of explanatory variables is a negative function, usually defined 
as , so model has the following form: 
 
          
 
This model can be estimated initially without imposing any specific functional form on the baseline hazard 
function, following the Cox Model. An alternative estimation can be done by imposing one specific 
parametric form to the function . In this case, the models most commonly used are the Weibull Model 
and the Exponential Model. In the Weibull Model, , where  is a parameter that has to be 
estimated. When p = 1, the Weibull Model is equal to the Exponential Model, where there exists no 
dependency on duration. On the other hand, when the parameter p > 1, there exists a positive dependency 
on duration, and a negative dependency when p < 1. Therefore, by estimating p it is possible to test the 
hypotheses of duration dependency of fiscal consolidations. 
 
Apparently, the case examined in this study is a case of multiple failure-time data where more than one 
failure occurs for the same subject (country), causing failure-times to be correlated within cluster (country), 
violating the independence of failure-times assumption required in traditional survival analysis. If more than 
one spell is observed for a country, it is realistic to assume that these spells are not independent. Thus, 
likelihood function based on model (4) is misspecified for multiple spells since it does not account for intra-
country correlation of the spells observed on the same country.  
 
Following (Lin & Wei, 1989), it is necessary and sufficient to modify only the variance-covariance matrix of 
the estimators since the correlated durations affect the variance while the model parameters can be 
estimated consistently without accounting for this correlation. This implies that parameters of the model can 
be estimated by treating spells as independent, and then obtained variance and covariance estimates can 
be modified to account for the dependences. More precisely, given that estimated variance-covariance 
matrix obtained as the inverse of the information matrix does not take into account the additional correlation 
in the data, Lin and Wei (1989) propose a modification of the following form: 
 
           
 
where  is a matrix of the group efficient score residuals (  is the number of clusters 
( , while  is the number of time-dependent covariates).  
 
IV.2 Variables 
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Variables of interest are alternative borrowing control regimes, namely administrative, rule based, 
cooperative regime and market discipline, with base category including countries in which borrowing is 
prohibited at the sub-national level.  
 
Control Variables 
Vector of control variables includes a set of institutional, economic, political, and demographic variables 
that are expected to be related to different demands for expenditure financing and, therefore, different need 
for borrowing. Hence, these demands put a pressure on sub-national fiscal performance and affect the 
length of fiscal consolidation.  
 
The control variables are: 
1. Number of previous failures: this variable controls for the accumulated number of ends of fiscal 
consolidations that have taken place in each country before the current consolidation. It is, ceteris paribus, 
expected that the larger this number, the higher is the probability an episode of fiscal consolidation would 
end.  
 
2. Initial budget balance: this variable takes into account the fact that initial fiscal consolidations 
influence policymakers in deciding how much adjustment is needed to stabilize the public finances. This 
controls for the fact that countries with high budget balance may not feel compelled to continue with fiscal 
adjustment, as the balance may already be close to sustainable level. Therefore, this variable is expected 
to increase the probability of ending the consolidation episode. 
 
3. The size of the fiscal adjustment: this variable is measured as a cumulative change in the budget 
balance during the fiscal consolidation episode. The larger the size of the consolidation, the longer the 
episode is hypothesized to last, because a larger adjustment tends to signal the willingness of the 
authorities to achieve fiscal sustainability. 
 
4. Central government budget balance: Rodden (2002) argues that sub-national government fiscal 
performance may be positively correlated with the central government long-term fiscal performance. 
Plekhanov and Singh (2006) provide the following three reasons for this relationship. First, the average 
central government fiscal balance is a proxy for the society´s preference toward the fiscal sustainability. 
Second, the average central government fiscal balance captures possible business cycle effects, especially 
for countries having few observations on sub-national government fiscal balance. Third, central government 
fiscal balance partly absorbs the effects of fiscal crises that affect the fiscal performance. Therefore, longer 
consolidation episodes are expected in sub-national and general government budgets in countries with well 
behaved central governments. 
 
5. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: this variable is measured as a percentage of sub-national received 
grants of their total revenue and represents the sub-national government dependence on the central 
government. The literature provides the evidence that higher vertical fiscal imbalance is positively 
correlated with sub-national fiscal indiscipline and high spending, hence with shorter consolidation 
episodes. 
 
6. Fiscal decentralization: fiscal decentralization is measured as a share of sub-national own 
revenues in total general government revenues Prud'homme (1994) argues that one of the dangers of 
decentralization is that it makes macroeconomic stabilization programs more difficult to implement because 
sub-national government fiscal policies can run counter to national policies.  It can, therefore, lead to worse 
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fiscal outcomes. Singh and Plekhanov (2006) indicate that it may also reflect the central government’s 
attempt to shift part of the fiscal burden onto sub-national governments. On the other side, (Shah, 2005) 
finds that fiscal decentralization is associated with improved fiscal performance and better functioning of 
internal common market. Hence, the effect of fiscal decentralization on duration of consolidation episode is 
ambiguous.  
 
7. Sub-national tax autonomy: variable tax autonomy takes value one if sub-national government has 
an authority to set tax rate and/or change the tax base. It is expected that sub-national governments with 
more tax autonomy are better able to optimize their revenues to their expenditure needs and avoid 
jeopardizing their fiscal balance.  This variable is therefore expected to be associated with longer 
consolidation periods. 
 
8. Borrowing for only investments purposes as opposed to allowing borrowing for deficit financing is 
expected to have positive effect on primary fiscal balance trough more than one channel. First, prohibiting 
borrowing for financing fiscal deficit positively affects sub-national fiscal responsibility. Second, borrowing 
for capital investments has potentially positive effect on increasing the sub-national revenue base in the 
long run and, through it, potential higher revenue collection.  
 
9. Corruption is measured by the survey-based perception index which takes value between zero and 
six, with higher index meaning lower corruption. Perceived corruption is assumed to be associated with 
weak government institutions and, therefore, lower fiscal discipline and higher probability of an end of 
consolidation episode.  
 
10. Government stability is an assessment both of the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs, and its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents 
(government unity, legislative strength, popular support), each with a maximum score of four points and a 
minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very 
High Risk. More stable governments are expected to more likely impose a harder budget constraint on all 
levels of government and may improve fiscal outcomes. 
 
11. GDP per capita growth: this variable is meant to account for better fiscal performance of developed 
countries. 
 
12. Population density: Increasing population density implies a higher cost of the publicly provided 
good due to congestion (Fenge & Meier, 2002) However, for some public goods, such as sewer, the cost 
can fall with increasing population density (Haug, 2004). This variable as well serves as a proxy for sub-
national administrative capacity and ability to successfully administer sub-national borrowing. Lower 
population density may indicate existence of smaller size of sub-national units that usually lack of staff. 
Having all mentioned in mind, as in case of fiscal decentralization, the effect of population density on fiscal 
performance is ambiguos.  
 
13. Finally, dummy for European Union member countries accounts for the “Maastricht effect” that 
imposes restrictions on fiscal behavior, both sub-national and national, and is expected to be associated 
with longer consolidation periods and lower probability of ending a consolidation episode.  
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V. Results 
 
Table 2 presents parameter estimates for the three alternative previously discussed hazard function 
specifications. Country-dummies are included in all regressions to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
coming from individual country effects.  The p parameter in the Weibull estimation is positive and greater 
than 1, indicating increasing hazard function over time.  
 
Log likelihood ratio, Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used to 
discriminate among three parametric models. Although the best fitting model is the one with the largest log 
likelihood, the preferred model is the one with the smallest AIC value. As Table 2 shows, the Weibull 
estimation is the parametric model that at the same time best fits our data (has the largest log likelihood) 
and is the most preferred (has the smallest both AIC and BIC value).  
 
As results suggest, most of the control variables that are statistically significant have expected effect on 
probability of ending consolidation episode. Estimated coefficients on variables of our primary interest, 
borrowing control regimes, suggest that, comparing with an option of prohibiting borrowing at the sub-
national level, countries that primarily rely on rule based, cooperative and administrative regime are more 
effective in maintaining fiscal consolidation, rule based regime being the most successful (about 77 percent 
smaller hazard than prohibiting sub-national borrowing). Results also suggest that market discipline as an 
instrument for controlling borrowing at the sub-national level perform worse in achieving fiscal sustainability 
than prohibit sub-national borrowing. This result may be explained by the requirements for successful 
market discipline that, as discussed above, in many countries, especially developing, are not fully met. 
However, our result suggest that the difference in the performance between prohibited and sub-national 
borrowing regulated by the marker is neither statistically nor economically significant. 
 
On the other hand, results suggest that in presence of high sub-national revenue dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers from the central government, countries relying on cooperative and 
administrative controls have significantly higher probability of ending fiscal consolidation episode that 
countries prohibiting borrowing at the sub-national level.  This result as well corresponds to the 
characteristics of these two regimes that both represent the highest level of central government control of 
sub-national borrowing, which in presence of high vertical fiscal imbalance may as well include larger 
probability of soft budget constraint. In this case, overall government fiscal balance suffers through two 
channels. First, existence of soft budget constraint results in lower sub-national fiscal responsibility. 
Second, bailing out the sub-national government deteriorates the central government budget and, through 
a spillover effect, budgets of other sub-national governments in the country that are as well highly fiscally 
dependent on intergovernmental transfers. Previously explanation of characteristics of the cooperative 
regime, that combines many individual advantages of the other three approaches, is in line with this result. 
 
 
VI. Robustness Analysis 
To check for robustness of the results, the parametric estimation from the previous section is replicated by 
using three alternative “Stronger” definitions of fiscal consolidation, namely, if an annual change in general 
government primary budget balance is less than 0.5, 0.75 and 1 percent. It can be said that the 0 percent 
threshold is the minimum threshold that one can impose to differentiate fiscal consolidation years from 
fiscal expansion ones. The 1 percent threshold is the most common in the literature on fiscal adjustments, 
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because it discriminates in favor of strong consolidation experiences, where the political commitment to 
reduce the public deficit is strong and cannot be attributed to unintended outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Parametric estimation of proportional hazard model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Weibull Exponential Cox 
Number of previous failures 1.146*** 1.075*** 1.096*** 
 (0.038) (0.018) (0.024) 
Initial budget balance 0.980 0.991 0.988 
 (0.028) (0.010) (0.017) 
Size of the adjustment 0.007** 0.042*** 0.029*** 
 (0.017) (0.044) (0.039) 
Central Government Primary Balance 0.832 0.931 0.836 
 (1.893) (0.826) (1.108) 
Administrative regime 0.306*** 0.621** 0.493*** 
 (0.136) (0.125) (0.132) 
Cooperative regime 0.343** 0.658* 0.552** 
 (0.166) (0.153) (0.165) 
Rule based regime 0.230** 0.523** 0.422** 
 (0.135) (0.139) (0.147) 
Market discipline 1.048 1.012 1.006 
 (1.536) (0.701) (0.894) 
Sub-national tax autonomy 0.642* 0.878 0.702* 
 (0.169) (0.103) (0.137) 
Borrowing only for capital investments 1.453 1.222 1.296 
 (0.581) (0.212) (0.291) 
Tax autonomy*Investments 0.571 0.749 0.730 
 (0.505) (0.297) (0.386) 
Sub-national own revenues 0.105 0.390 0.197 
 (0.196) (0.325) (0.234) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 0.026*** 0.276*** 0.127*** 
 (0.028) (0.126) (0.082) 
Administrative*VFI 25.391*** 3.086** 6.350*** 
 (30.216) (1.585) (4.520) 
Cooperative*VFI 15.017** 2.364 3.735* 
 (18.288) (1.256) (2.799) 
Rule based*VFI 6.741 1.607 2.156 
 (9.751) (1.036) (1.893) 
Market discipline*VFI 2.798 1.231 1.631 
 (6.561) (1.360) (2.347) 
Corruption 1.162 1.083* 1.109 
 (0.119) (0.051) (0.071) 
Government Stability 0.874*** 0.951** 0.922*** 
 (0.041) (0.020) (0.028) 
GDP per capita growth 0.980 0.989* 0.987 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) 
Population Density 0.986* 0.993** 0.991** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) 
EU membership 0.452*** 0.703*** 0.630*** 
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 (0.114) (0.082) (0.097) 
Duration Dependence Parameter (P) 2.607   
Log likelihood -689.446 -959.756 -4996.8 
AIC 1424.892 1963.512 10055.6 
BIC 1533.951 2067.829 10202.59 
Observations 847 847 847 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
As Table 3 shows, the number of failures under all three Stronger definitions is larger than under the 
Weaker definition. Furthermore, under the Stronger definitions, the average probability of ending the fiscal 
consolidation is higher than under the Weaker one, and increases with the threshold, while the average 
duration decreases with the threshold. The maximum duration under all three Stronger definitions is 7 
years, with around 68, 72 and 77 percent of consolidations ending after only one year for threshold 0.5, 
0.75 and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Failure and Duration,  Alternative definitions of fiscal consolidation 
 Threshold 0% Threshold 0.5% Threshold 0.75% Threshold 1% 
 Failure 
Mean 0.390 0.668 0.717 0.760 
Standard Deviation 0.488 0.471 0.451 0.428 
Variance 0.238 0.222 0.204 0.184 
Skewness 0.453 -0.715 -0.962 -1.213 
Kurtosis 1.205 1.511 1.925 2.470 
Number of failures 330 566 607 643 
Observations 847 847 847 847 
 Duration 
Mean 2.267 1.542 1.431 1.345 
Standard Deviation 1.164 0.972 0.861 0.748 
Variance 2.770 0.944 0.740 0.560 
Skewness 1.819 2.244 2.619 2.871 
Kurtosis 6.742 8.740 11.175 13.428 
Observations 847 847 847 847 
 
 
Figure 4 compares the duration of fiscal consolidations between alternative definitions of fiscal 
consolidation. Unlike with the Weak definition, where 30 percent of fiscal consolidations lasted three or 
more years, with Stronger definitions this percentage decreases to only 13 percent or less.11   
                                                            
11 13.6 percent for 0.5 threshold; 9.6 percent for 0.75 threshold; 7.3 percent for 1 percent threshold.  
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the Kaplan-Meier survivor and hazard estimates respectively, for all thresholds. 
Graphs show that the probability of maintaining the consolidation after the first year decreases with larger 
threshold, while after the second or third year the probability decreases at a slower rate under the Stronger 
definitions than under the Weak one. This behavior is translated into a smoothed hazard function that 
shows higher positive dependence on accumulated duration under the Stronger definitions than under the 
Weaker one. 
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Finally, the original model is re-estimated using the Stronger definitions of fiscal consolidation under the 
new definition of fiscal consolidation. If results obtained under the 1 percent threshold are robust, 
estimates on explanatory variables will maintain their “signs” and statistical significance. Table 4 presents 
a comparison of the Weibull estimation under the Weaker (threshold 0%) and all three Stronger (threshold 
0.5%, 0.75% and 1%) definitions of fiscal consolidation.    
 
Table 4 presents results on main variables of interest, sub-national control regimes and selected control 
variables. Results suggest that with stronger definition of fiscal consolidation, only rule based control and 
administrative control seem to be consistently more effective in maintaining fiscal discipline than prohibited 
borrowing at the sub-national level. A surprising result is obtained on market discipline which completely 
changes sign once a stronger definition of fiscal consolidation is employed. This result may possibly be 
explained by stronger importance of transparency and governance in imposing tighter requirements in 
maintaining fiscal consolidation, and in such countries, market discipline is efficient instrument for sub-
national borrowing control. Result on government stability is in favor of this preposition. Moreover, with 
high fiscal dependence on intergovernmental transfers from central government, none of the regimes 
seem to be efficient in maintaining fiscal consolidation when the applied threshold is higher. This result 
certainly is in favor of the conjecture that larger sub-national dependence on financing from the central 
government budget increases the risk of moral hazard, reduces sub-national fiscal responsibility and may 
result in overspending. 
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Table4. Parametric Weibull Estimation by Threshold 
 0.0% 0.5% 0.75% 0.1% 
Number of previous failures 1.146*** 0.991 0.977 0.980 
 (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Initial budget balance 0.980 0.952** 0.933** 0.917*** 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) (0.029) 
Size of the adjustment 0.007** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.017) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Administrative regime 0.306*** 0.264** 0.390* 0.381 
 (0.136) (0.161) (0.190) (0.224) 
Cooperative regime 0.343** 0.567 1.095 0.993 
 (0.166) (0.395) (0.680) (0.676) 
Rule based regime 0.230** 0.206** 0.434 0.371* 
 (0.135) (0.128) (0.231) (0.209) 
Market discipline 1.048 0.060** 0.167 0.161 
 (1.536) (0.079) (0.225) (0.272) 
Administrative*VFI 25.391*** 14.699 16.648** 15.069 
 (30.216) (24.426) (23.669) (26.255) 
Cooperative*VFI 15.017** 6.104 1.954 1.733 
 (18.288) (10.943) (3.138) (3.069) 
Rule based*VFI 6.741 8.694 17.416* 22.452* 
 (9.751) (15.859) (28.882) (40.090) 
Market discipline*VFI 2.798 56.836* 25.773 106.422 
 (6.561) (135.319) (63.607) (314.500) 
Duration Dependence Parameter (P) 2.607 2.678 2.695 2.709 
Log likelihood -689.446 -550.965 -493.473 -430.221 
AIC 1424.892 1147.929 1032.945 906.443 
BIC 1533.951 1256.988 1142.004 1015.502 
Observations 847 847 847 847 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
VII. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
 
This article examined the effect of main four sub-national borrowing control regimes, relative to prohibited 
borrowing at the sub-national level, on duration of sub-national governments’ fiscal consolidations using 
panel data for 60 countries for the period between 1990 and 2008. Baseline definition for fiscal 
sustainability in this study assumes threshold of 0 percent and robustness of the results obtained using this 
definition is tested by increasing the threshold from zero to 1.  
 
The results suggest cooperative regime performs dominantly in sustaining fiscal consolidation, which is 
somewhat in line with the property of this approach that it combines the advantages off all other three 
approaches. Second, results suggest that market discipline performs the least favorably comparing to other 
three approaches and prohibited sub-national borrowing, which corresponds to the fact that in many 
countries the requirements for market discipline as a successful instrument for sub-national borrowing 
control are not met. Finally, administrative and cooperative regimes in presence of high fiscal dependence 
on central government financing seem to increase the probability of ending a consolidation episode. This 
result is not surprising given that these two regimes refer to significantly high degree of central government 
control, which may increase the risk of moral hazard. Strong central government control may give 
encouraging signs to the sub-national governments to over borrow and to expect being bailed out by the 
central government. This deteriorates the general government budget directly, through unplanned bailout 
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from the central government, and indirectly, through spillover effect on other sub-national governments who 
are as well highly fiscally dependent on central government financing. Finally, the robustness analysis 
suggests that the administrative controls over sub-national borrowing consistently perform dominantly 
comparing to other regimes. However, this effect vanishes with large central government financing to the 
sub-national budget.  
 
The results obtained in this study imply following policy recommendations. First, sub-national government 
borrowing does not have to endanger overall fiscal sustainability if the borrowing control framework is well 
designed. Second, reducing fiscal dependence on central government financing and, in return, giving more 
tax autonomy to sub-national government, reduces the risk of moral hazard and improves the effectiveness 
of borrowing control in maintaining fiscal balance at the sustainable level.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics           
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Prohibited  847 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Administrative 847 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Cooperative 847 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Rule Based 847 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Market Discipline 847 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Sub-national Tax Autonomy 847 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Borrowing for only investment purpose 847 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
General Government Primary Balance 847 0.04 0.08 -0.32 0.75 
Central Government Primary Balance 847 0.02 0.06 -0.36 0.37 
Sub-national Own Revenues 847 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.69 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 847 0.39 0.21 0.01 0.89 
GDP per capita growth rate 847 3.11 4.01 -21.17 14.02 
Population density 847 106.57 105.56 2.22 492.32 
Corruption 847 3.61 1.44 0.33 6.00 
Government Stability 847 8.31 1.71 2.92 12.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Sample structure by sub-national borrowing control regime   
  Number of observations Percentage Number of id* 
Prohibited  146 17.24 16 
Administrative 331 39.08 30 
Cooperative 119 14.05 7 
Rule Based 103 12.16 10 
Market Discipline 148 17.47 9 
Total 847 100  
* Does not add to 60 because countries change dominant control regime over the observed period 
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Table A3. Variable description and sources   
Variable  Description Source 
Prohibited  =1 if sub-national government prohibited 
Administrative 
=1 if administrative is dominant sub-
national borrowing control regime 
Cooperative 
=1 if cooperative is dominant sub-
national borrowing control regime 
Rule Based 
=1 if rule based is dominant sub-national 
borrowing control regime 
Market Discipline 
=1 if market discipline is dominant as 
sub-national borrowing control regime 
Sub-national Tax Autonomy 
=1 if sub-national government has 
authority to set tax rates and/or choose 
tax base 
Borrowing for only investment 
=1 if sub-national borrowing is allowed 
only for investment purposes 
Various sources 
(See Table A4 for details) 
General Government Primary Balance 
General Government: Revenue - 
Expenditures + Interest Payments 
Central Governmetn Primary Balance 
Central Government: Revenue - 
Expenditures + Interest Payments 
Sub-national Own Revenues 
Share of sub-national own revenues in 
total general government revenues 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 
Share of sub-national intergovernmental 
transfers received from the central 
government in total sub-national 
revenues 
Government Finance Statistics  
Database, International Monetary 
Fund; Various individual country 
sources 
(See Table A4 for details) 
GDP per capita growth rate 
Annual nominal GDP per capita growth 
rate 
Population density Population per square kilometer 
World Development Indicators 
Corruption 
Assessment of corruption within the 
political system 
Government Stability 
Assessment both of the government’s 
ability to carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability to stay in office 
International Country Risk Guide, 
The PRS Group 
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Table A4. Suurces on Government Finance and Qualitative Indicators by Country   
id Country Observed Period Government Finance Qualitative Indicators 
1 Albania 2000 - 2008 
Fiscal Statistics of Government, 2008, Ministry of Finance, 
Albania 
Dabla-Norris (2006); Urban 
Institute (2007); World Bank (2008) 
2 Argentina 1990 - 2004 IMF GFS Reid (2003); O'Neill (2006) 
3 Armenia 2002 - 2008 IMF GFS Boex et al. (2005); OECD (2006) 
4 Australia 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS Koutsogeorgopoulou (2007) 
5 Austria 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1999); OECD 
(2003); Fuentes et al. (2006); IMF 
(2008) 
6 Azerbaijan 1994 - 1999 IMF GFS Mikayilov (2007) 
7 Belarus 1992 - 2008 IMF GFS World Bank (1997) 
8 Belgium 1990 - 2007 IMF GFS IMF (2001); OECD (2007) 
9 Bolivia 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS IMF (2006) 
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 - 2008 IMF GFS Glasser et al. (2000) 
11 Brazil 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS; Ministry of Finance Brazil (http://www.fazenda.gov.br/) 
Mora and Varsano (2001); Eaton 
and Dickovick (2004); De Mello 
(2007) 
12 Bulgaria 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS Nikolov (2006) 
13 Canada 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS OECD (2003) 
14 Chile 1991 - 2008 IMF GFS OECD (2009) 
15 China 1995 - 2008 IMF GFS Dabla-Norris (2005) 
16 Colombia 1998 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Dillinger and Webb (1999); 
Chaparro et al. ((2005) 
17 Costa Rica 2001 - 2007 IMF GFS Hall et al. (2002) 
18 Croatia 1994 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Bajo (2004); Bajo (2007); 
Alibegovic (2007) 
19 Czech Republic 1993 - 2008 IMF GFS Jezek et al. (2004); Dillinger (2007) 
20 Denmark 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1997, 2008); 
Rattso (2005) 
21 El Salvador 2001 - 2008 IMF GFS IADB (1997) 
22 Estonia 1995 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Janso et al. (2004); Trasberg 
(2004); Dillinger (2007) 
23 Finland 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1997, 2009); 
OECD (2003) 
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24 France 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1997), Leprince 
(2007) 
25 Georgia 1996 - 2007 IMF GFS Boex et al. (2005) 
26 Germany 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS Council of Europe (1998) 
27 Greece 1994 - 2007 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (2000); 
Hawkesworth (2008) 
28 Honduras 2002 - 2008 IMF GFS IADB (1997) 
29 Hungary 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Pigey (1999), Balas et al. (2004); 
Kovacs (2007) 
30 Iceland 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1997, 2006); 
OECD (2006) 
31 India 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS; Ministry of Finance India (http://finmin.nic.in/) 
Rao and Singh (2001), Purfield 
(2004); Heredia-Ortiz and Rider 
(2005); Garg (2007) 
32 Indonesia 1990 - 2008 
IMF GFS; Central Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of 
Indonesia 
(http://www.bps.go.id/aboutus.php?tabel=1&id_subyek=13) 
ADB (2003); Alm and Indrawati 
(2004); World Bank (2007) 
33 Ireland 1990 - 2007 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1998); OECD 
(2003) 
34 Italy 1994 - 2008 IMF GFS Giuriato and Gastaldi (2009) 
35 Japan 2001 - 2007 IMF GFS; Japan Statistical Yearbook, various years 
Mochida (2001), Aoki (2008), 
Mochida (2008) 
36 Kazakhstan 1997 - 2008 IMF GFS Leschenko and Troschke (2006) 
37 Korea 2005 - 2008 IMF GFS; Ministry of Strategy and Finance, South Korea Kim (2003), OECD (2003) 
38 Latvia 1994 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Dunn and Wetzel (1999); Viktor 
(2004); Council of Europe (2006) 
39 Lithuania 1991 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1996, 2006), 
Zigiene et al. (2008) 
40 Macedonia 2005 - 2008 IMF GFS Nikolov (2006) 
41 Mexico 1990 - 2000 IMF GFS Giugale et al. (2000) 
42 Netherlands 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS Kopits and Symansky (1998) 
43 Norway 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1997), Rattso 
(2005) 
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44 Pakistan 1997 - 2008 
IMF GFS; Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, various years, Federal 
Bureau of Statistics Bahl, Wallace and Cyan (2008) 
45 Panama 1990 - 1994 IMF GFS IMF (2006) 
46 Poland 1993 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Kopanska and Levitas (2004); 
Dillinger (2007) 
47 Portugal 1990 - 2007 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (2006); OECD 
(2008) 
48 Romania 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Belcher et al. (1997); Nikolov 
(2006) 
49 Russian Federation 1998 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Freinkman and Yossifov (1999); 
Danielian (2002); Nikiforov et al. 
(2004); Singh (2009) 
50 Serbia 2002 - 2008 
Bulletin, Public Finance, December 2009, Ministry of Finance 
Serbia (http://www.mfin.sr.gov.yu/eng/) Republic of Serbia (2005, 2006) 
51 Slovakia 1996 - 2008 IMF GFS Kling and Niznansky (2004) 
52 Slovenia 1992 - 2007 IMF GFS Klun (2006) 
53 South Africa 1990 - 2007 IMF GFS Liebig et al. (2008) 
54 Spain 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (2002); 
Ahmad et al. (2005); Toboso 
(2007) 
55 Sweden 1990 - 2001 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1996); Rattso 
(2005); Ministry of Finance 
Sweden (2005); SALAR (2006), 
Toonen et al. (2007) 
56 Switzerland 1990 - 2007 IMF GFS Feld et al. (2003) 
57 Ukraine 1998 - 2008 IMF GFS 
German Advisory Group (2004), 
OECD (2006) 
58 United Kingdom 1990 - 2008 IMF GFS 
Council of Europe (1999), OECD 
(2003) 
59 United States 1990 - 2001 IMF GFS Thomas (2005) 
60 Vietnam 2002 - 2008 
Ministry of Finance, Vietnam 
(http://www.mof.gov.vn/DefaultE.aspx?tabid=5740) Wescott (2006) 
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